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§ 1.  ABSTRACT
THIS PAPER introduces a game-theoretical framework for 
The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development, axioms and a 
complimentary negotiation model which help clarify the 
problem itself, and, reductio ad absurdum, falsify many 
widely-held economic, evolutionary, and ecological 
principles.  This brief communiqué lays the foundation for 
evolutionary stable economic development and survival 
strategies – strategies which foster international 
cooperation, global threat mitigation, food & energy 
security, long-distance dispersibility, and thus, ultimately, 
the long-term survival of the human species.
§ 2.  INTRODUCTION
THE THEORY presented here was developed to address 
core aspects of The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development 
as they relate to the problem of long-term human survival 
on Earth (and beyond, for that matter).  As noted in “one of 
the best abstracts” UK economist Rob Elliot has “read for 
many a month” (1), Darwin's On the Origin of Species by Means 
of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the 
Struggle for Life (2)
launched evolution into theoretical orbit and it 
continues to influence its course.  This magnum opus 
detailed a tenable solution to the most fundamental 
problem of human existence, and although this 
Promethean vision contains a few minor errors, 
there   is   one   nontrivial   error   which   misguides 
several crucial developments – not only in the 
evolving structure of evolutionary theory, but across 
the entire spectrum of science, including politico-
economics.   This problem has led theorists to 
mistakenly favour earth-based inputs over cosmic 
inputs, to over- emphasize biological evolution, and 
to   under-emphasize   stellar   evolution.   These 
perceptive, methodological, and logical errors have, 
in   turn,   emphasized   the   significance   of   the 
individual “struggle against competitors” over the 
cooperative   “struggle   against   inclement 
environments”,   and   thus   fashionable   theories 
relating to Global Warming, The Problem of Sustainable 
Economic Development, and The Tragedy of the Commons 
have been erected upon false and sandy foundations 
and suggest evolutionarily unstable solutions (3).
Indeed, these fashionable yet entirely false theoretical 
developments - - especially those pertaining to The Tragedy of 
the Commons  - - have been tabled by popular and influential 
theorists from Garret Hardin (4) to Elinor Ostrom (3).
     The following game-theoretical framework is an effort to 
correct these errors.
§ 3.  THESIS
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT has long been 
pursued from bases as diverse as geography and 
geochemistry, ecology and economics, or physics 
and political science. Increasingly, however, a core 
sustainability   science   research   program   that 
transcends   the   concerns   of   its   foundational 
disciplines and focuses instead on understanding the 
complex   dynamics   that   arise   from   interactions 
between   human   and   environmental   systems…. 
How can those dynamic interactions be better 
incorporated   into   emerging   models   and 
conceptualizations that integrate the Earth system, 
social development, and sustainability?   How are 
long-term trends in environment and development 
reshaping nature-society?  What factors determine 
the limits of resilience and sources of vulnerability 
for such interactive systems?   What systems of 
incentive structures can most effectively improve 
social capacity to guide interactions between nature 
and society toward more sustainable trajectories? 
How   can   science   and   technology   be   more 
effectively harnessed to address sustainability?
(5, p 1737).
We will begin to answer these questions and several others, 
and in light of this ambitious undertaking, we must hit the 
ground running:  How can these dynamic interactions be better 
incorporated into a model for sustainability?
One states as axioms several properties that it 
would seem natural for the solution to have and 
then   one   discovers   that   the   axioms   actually 
determine   the   solution   uniquely.   [Our]   two 
approaches to the problem, via the negotiation 
model [and] via the axioms, are complementary; 
each helps…justify and clarify the other (6, p 129).
§ 4.  AXIOMS
Axiom I – Survival Certainty Premise.  Our first 
axiom is often referred to as The Ground Zero Premise or 
simply The  Will to Survive. Darwin called it The Struggle for Life 
(1), the elementary evolutionary truth which simply 
stipulates that survival is the object of the game (cf 7, p vii-
viii).  Many evolutionary theorists have puzzled over the fact 
that this axiom eludes many (e.g., 8-9).
Axiom II – Resource Uncertainty Premise.  Global 
natural resource consumption is estimated at rates ranging 
from 20% to 300% of earthly replenishing rates; however, 
in light of Axiom  V and Axiom  VI, this figure is ultimately 
indeterminable, as future demand (as altered by future, 
stochastic events) is unknowable (see Axiom  VI).
1Axiom III – Ecological Uncertainty Premise. Axiom II 
poses uncertain and unquantifiable threats (negative 
externalities) to Axiom I and Axiom IV.  However, scientific and 
technological advances derived through inter-dependent 
linkages associated with Axiom II also ultimately yield 
uncertain and unquantifiable positive externalities toward the 
mitigation of Axioms IV-VI.
Axiom IV – Political Uncertainty Premise (10-14).
Survival…is   the   basic,   continuing,   inescapable 
problem for all living organisms [e.g., Axiom I]... It 
follows that survival is the... ‘problem’ for [nations] 
as   well;  it   is   a   prerequisite   for   any   other… 
objectives…. Our economic and social life…, [and] 
the actions of… governments... [is] directly or 
indirectly related to… meeting… survival needs 
(13, abstract).
The most significant logical implication which follows from 
this axiom is that economic power is derivative (15). 
Axiom V – Planetary Uncertainty Premise.
Even if we are able to mitigate threats posed by Axiom II and 
Axiom IV (i.e. Warfighting), in light of Axiom I and Axiom IV, 
planetary uncertainty mandates that an inhabitable planet 
must be discovered, and the ultimate feat in long-distance 
dispersal must be achieved within an unknown and 
unknowable time-frame,  ≈50,000 years from present (14).
     Although details pertaining to risk factors outlined below 
represent a considerable discourse in of itself, an useful 
survey (14) highlights and ranks many known risks.
     However, any and all known and unknown risks are 
theoretically included: the object is not to provide an 
exhaustive list of global risks, but rather highlight the hereto 
unrecognized nature of the dilemma astrophysical and 
planetary phænomena present to The Problem of Sustainable 
Economic Development. The Cosmic Connection: How Astronomical 
Events Impact Life on Earth (16) offers an excellent overview. 
It may also be of interest to note, however, that global 
warming is ranked 9th (ranked 8th in 14), and only three are 
anthropogenic. Risks are presented in an order of 
approximate relevance, but these risk factors ultimately lie 
well-beyond the reach of probability theory:
     (i) The Problem of Meteorites (cf 14; 16-17)
     (ii) The Problem of Super-Eruptions  (cf 14 ; 18)
     (iii) The Problem of Supermassive Star Collapse  (cf 16 ; 19)
     (iv) The Problem of Chaotic Behaviour  (cf 16 ; 19)
     (v) The Problem of Solar Flux  (cf 14; 16)
     (vi)  The Problem of Ohmic Decay (cf 16 ; 20)
     (vii) The Problem of Industrial Agricultural (cf 21-22)
     (viii) The Problem of Landrace & Richness Loss (23)
     (ix) The Problem of Global  Warming (cf. 14 ; 24)
     (x) The Problem of Ice Ages (cf. 14 ; 16)
Axiom VI – Universal Uncertainty Premise.
This may represent the least understood, simple truth on 
Earth (cf. 25-26).  Do we have ample reason to believe the sun 
will rise tomorrow?  Many conclude that, yes, based upon 
5,292.5 billion affirmative inferences (365 days X 14.5 
Byr), the sun will rise tomorrow.  However, Axiom  V 
highlights phænomena which eventually will falsify this 
inference.  “Man has an intense desire for assured 
knowledge.  That is why Hume’s clear message was 
crushing” (27, p 22).
§ 5.  DISCUSSION
WE DO indeed discover that our axioms do determine a 
solution, as the true nature of countless widely-held – 
though obviously false – theories immediately come to light. 
Again, in our endeavour to avoid impossibilities, we will 
highlight several with a simplified version (temporarily 
setting Axiom IV aside) of The Truly Noncooperative Game of Life 
on Earth:
WHAT ARE THE RULES OF THE GAME?
 Axioms I – III,  Axioms   V –  VI
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE GAME?
 Homo sapiens (P1) vs. Universe (P2).
WHAT IS THE OBJECT OF THE GAME?
P1 =  Survival.
P2 = ?
The Dilemma.  As we strategize, a dilemma becomes 
apparent before play even begins:  In light of the fact that 
P2‘s objective = unknown, P1 faces the dilemma presented by 
universal uncertainty (Axiom  VI): P1 survival requires 
defending relative insularity (of which, more to follow), but 
this defense must be split between two essentially contradictory 
strategies:  S1:  defending Ecological Insularity (Axioms I-III), 
and S2:  defending Planetary Insularity (Axioms IV-V). 
     In other words, all quests for long-term human survival 
require splitting resources and efforts between two 
conflicting and counter-productive objectives, but     Axiom  VI     
renders it impossible to determine how much to allocate to 
each over time.      The impassable difficulty lies within the     
observation that we can not nor will ever be sufficiently 
informed to understand how much or how many relatively 
‘ecologically degrading’ economic activities have been and 
always will be required in our necessarily never-ending race 
to formulate and develop solutions relating to     S   2.      
     Indeed, this highlights the disquieting nature of The 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (28).
     But all hope is not lost; this dilemma does not negate the 
existence of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (29).  As several 
problem-solvers noted regarding an otherwise gloomy 
outlook for African food security, “the range of possible 
2human outcomes is large and depends primarily upon the 
choices that we make” (30, p 11086); although we are 
certainly in the hands of Nature, much depends upon our 
hands as well:  To this point, recall that “the laws of nature 
are approximate…:  we first find the ‘wrong’ ones, and then 
we find the ‘right’ ones” (31, p 2); indeed, our Axioms enable 
us to hone in on the ‘right’ ones through a sweeping process 
of elimination.  Several implications which follow from our 
theoretical framework falsify a wide-range of theories—
including the canons of a number of influential 
contemporary ideologies.
     Let’s explore a few logical implications and highlight 
several glaring errors.
Brundtland’s Error. Sustainable Development in Small Island 
Development States: Issues and Challenges notes the ‘seminal’ 
Brundtland Report defined sustainability as:
Development that meets the needs of the present 
without   compromising   the   ability   of   future 
generations to meet their own needs (32, p 1).
A review of the vast body of related literature reveals that 
this definition is almost universally accepted, but we trust 
that we have begun to demonstrate that this definition is 
theoretically untenable.  Yet countless theorists have fallen 
and continue to stumble into this trap:
Population growth, rising per capita consumption 
and the use of environmentally malign technologies 
are steadily eroding [ecological] services….   A 
major problem is to determine how to allocate 
resources in various ways to solve the human 
predicament.     Scientists   have   much   of   the 
information necessary for making those decisions, 
so the biggest problem is in the purview of social 
scientists.  They must help to determine how best to 
move   society   from   knowledge   to   action 
(33:abstract).
But our Axioms demonstrate that ‘scientists’ do not nor ever 
will have the “necessary information” for making these 
decisions.
     How remarkable that this conclusion was derived 
without the aid of our indirect proof in that revolutionary 
year of 1776 (10).  Innumerable and inevitable ‘altered 
circumstances,’ which an equal number of ecologists, 
economists, biologists, sociologists, and sundry social 
theorists have failed to recognize, will present themselves in 
due course and – quite literally – pound their conjectures to 
dust.
On Truly Noncooperative Games.  Chapter one of FM 
21-76, ‘The Will to Survive,’ begins: “Two things that you 
can do now to help you prepare are train for survival in 
different environments and learn about the area where you 
are going” (34, p 1-1), but in light of Axiom  VI, we remain 
forever unable to learn about the area where we are going 
because ‘we’ are ‘going’ into the unknown and unknowable 
future, and thus we must emphasize an important section of 
a revolutionary thesis (35):
There are situations in economics or international 
politics in which, effectively, a group of interests are 
involved in a non-cooperative game without being 
aware of it; the non-awareness [makes] the situation 
truly non-cooperative (36, p 23).
Indeed, there have always been inescapable situations and 
there always will be inescapable situations which make the 
situation truly non-cooperative. In reality, any and all games 
are truly noncooperative games. Ironically, however, our 
relentless quest for human survival happens to hinge upon 
unprecedented levels of international cooperation.
On the Law of Superabundance.
How much is enough?… What are the minimum 
conditions   for   the   long-term   persistence   and 
adaptation of a species or population in a given 
place?  This   is   one   of   the   most   difficult   and 
challenging intellectual problems in conservation 
biology. Arguably, it is the quintessential issue in 
population biology (37, p 1-2).
If our answer to this question is not already implicitly clear, 
we shall render it explicitly: this problem is also insoluble. A 
half-century prior to two of the most significant explorers 
in this arena (38), a path-breaking, preliminary exploration 
began as follows:
I think I may fairly make two postulata.
     First, That food is necessary to the existence of 
man.
     Secondly, That the passion between the sexes is 
necessary and will remain nearly in its present state 
(39, p 4).
These ‘postulata,’ Darwin’s ‘Malthusian Insight’ of 1838, 
demonstrated an intuitive grasp of The Law of Super-
abundance, and, in light of our Axioms, we discover that real 
solutions are neither ‘population control’ (40-41), nor 
“[increasing] global food and timber supply to accommodate 
a world growing to 10 billion or more” (42, p 19679), 
because we’re unable to pursue either strategy with any 
justifiable conviction since The Law of Super-abundance 
stipulates, “the effort towards population …[is] always 
greater than the means to support it” (39, p 12). And of 
course nature knows best, because populations may be 
decimated (or be wiped-out entirely) at any point in time; 
we have outlined scenarios whereby, “even if death doesn’t 
get you right away, you’re unlikely to have much spare 
energy for sex” (43, p 124).
3On the True Nature of Economic Organization.
Very few of us realize… the intensively unusual, 
unstable, complicated, unreliable, temporary nature 
of the economic organization by which [we] live... 
We   assume   some   of   the   most   peculiar   and 
temporary   of   our   late   advantages   as   natural, 
permanent, and to be depended on, and we lay our 
plans   accordingly.   On   this   sandy   and   false 
foundation we scheme for social improvement and 
dress our political platforms, pursue our animosities 
and particular ambitions, and feel ourselves with 
enough margin in hand to foster, not assuage, civil 
conflict….
     But perhaps it is only in England and America 
that it is possible to be so unconscious… The earth 
heaves and no one but is aware of the rumblings. 
There   is   not   just   a   matter   of…  ‘[economic] 
troubles’; but of life and death, of starvation and 
existence, and of the fearful convulsions of a dying 
civilization (44, p 3-4).
As we have clearly illustrated, innumerable phænomena 
eventually will instantly (perhaps with little or no warning) 
render many, most, or all human survivors (if, that is, there 
are any) – from Professors to Presidents to Philosopher 
kings – nomads, fishermen, gatherers, warriors (mostly 
unarmed), and  “hunters, the lowest and rudest state of 
society” (10, p 747). To make matters worse, it takes years – 
even generations – to become Jägermeistern, to acquire skills 
which are being rapidly lost, and of course one must have 
guns & ammo in order to shoot anything. Someday – 
possibly tonight – perhaps not for another million years, 
but, in all likelihood, sometime in the next 50,000 years, 
millions, perhaps even billions of people – especially the 
increasingly inter-dependent inhabitants of the so-called 
‘first-world’ – will discover just how much Darwinian 
fitness they truly do or do not possess.
§ 6.  SYNTHESIS
AS WORD of Humboldt's death filtered around the 
world, there was an outpouring of… reverence 
befitting a beloved international celebrity….  The 
Herald lauded him as ‘one of the greatest men of his 
age or of any other age.... He had a gigantic 
intellect, from which nothing in nature or in science 
appeared to be hid. He could grasp all subjects, and 
he appeared to know everything....  Cosmos  is his 
imperishable monument, which will endure as long 
as the earth which it describes.’ The Tribune averred, 
‘His fame belonged not only to Europe, but to the 
world; and in this country especially, probably no 
man who was known to us only through the 
medium of his scientific writings was held in equal 
reverence and admiration.... But what will ever 
distinguish Humboldt from the mass of physical 
inquirers who had preceded him, is his study of the 
universe as a harmonious whole, and his search for 
the laws of order, beauty, and majesty beneath the 
apparent confusion and contradictions of isolated 
appearances….’
     We may well ask, If Humboldt was so widely 
celebrated and so beloved during his long life…, 
why has he been largely forgotten in our own 
time?....
         Above all he was a generalist, intent on 
examining every natural process and shaping the 
myriad discordant data into a coherent whole, as in 
Cosmos. However, by the mid-nineteenth century, 
science was progressing so rapidly that it was 
increasingly becoming the province of specialists, as 
shown   by   the   trend   to   replace   university 
departments of Natural Philosophy with the narrower 
disciplines that we know today (45, p 327-330).
This trend has led to systemic failures ranging from the 
Denaturalization of Economics (46) to the Transformative 
Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity (47).  Indeed, as Hardin 
noted,
it is easy to call for interdisciplinary syntheses, but 
will anyone respond? Scientists know how to train 
the young in narrowly focused work; but how do 
you teach people to stitch together established 
specialties   that   perhaps   should   not   have   been 
separated in the first place?....
     My first attempt at interdisciplinary analysis led 
to an essay, The Tragedy of the Commons. Since it first 
appeared   in  Science  25   years  ago,  it   has   been 
included   in   anthologies   on   ecology, 
environmentalism,   health   care,   economics, 
population   studies,   law,   political   science, 
philosophy,   ethics,   geography,   psychology,   and 
sociology.   It   became   required   reading   for   a 
generation of students and teachers seeking to meld 
multiple disciplines in order to come up with better 
ways to live in balance with the environment (48, p 
682).
To this point, your Author was born in August of 1968, just 
after The Tragedy of the Commons was read before the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, and thus I am 
amongst the second generation to heed Hardin’s call; and 
“by bringing together all the phenomena and creations 
which the earth has to offer” (45, p 27), perhaps I have indeed 
begun to meld multiple disciplines in order to come up with the best 
possible way to live in balance with the environment.
4     “This sketch is most imperfect; but in so short a space I 
cannot make it better” (38, p 50).  For more details, 
including methodological desiderata, personal intents, 
motivations, and full disclosure, please refer to On the Truly 
Noncooperative Game of Life on Earth: In Search of the Unity of 
Nature & Evolutionary Stable Strategy (49).
Matt Funk, FLS$£
Prince Edward Island, 18 December 2009
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